It is no secret that there are some pretty good rules of thumb for anyone contemplating military action. Among others, a guy called Clauswitz stated some of them pretty clearly well over 100 years ago -and soldiers have been studying them ever since.

The problem is that in democratic countries it is generally accepted that the military chiefs take their orders from the civilian government. There is the rub!

There is nothing wrong with the civvy guys deciding what should be done from a philosophical standpoint. It is just that usually they have NOT studied Clauswitz or usually any other military theory.

Perhaps we should make "Military Studies 101" a basic requirement for politicians. If you haven't passed the course you are not allowed to play in the sandbox.

I suspect that in the day when we first sent our troops to Kabul the politicians involved in sending them said to themselves "Lets show our solidarity with the US (but not with their Iraq adventure) by joining ISAF and sending some troops. There isn't really a war there and after a few months we can bring the boys home and get a lot of international kudos."

It is unfortunate that no one bothered to write down exactly what we expected these troops to actually DO. Unfortunate because we need to have such a statement not only to guide them in their actions but also to decide when they are DONE!

Also, the matter of what they are to do should dictate exactly what sort of formation we send, how they are to be equipped, and how many of them are required.

"Go to Hill X, take it, and hold until relieved" That is a clear order.

Instead I suspect our troops were told something equivalent to "Go to Afghanistan and help out".

But it appears there was no clear guidance.

Instead (again I suspect, but cannot prove it) the decision was made to simply send the smallest possible (read cheapest) contingent.

We all know about the rule of 3. It states basically that if you want to "win" a military engagement you would do well to outnumber the enemy by a factor of 3 to one.

So if you want to defeat a platoon of 30 men you would do well to send a company of 3 platoons or 90 men. You would also be well advised to send along a troop of guns for fire support, a troop of tanks, and a troop of field engineers. Also along for the ride would have to be medical and logistics troops.

We would describe this force as a company battlegroup -and that is essentially what we sent to Kabul "in the day".

But remember -this sized unit is really only "guaranteed" to defeat a platoon-sized enemy,and of course...there ARE no guarantees!

Here is the problem.

There WAS no enemy platoon. Accordingly there WAS no platoon sized objective. A platoon might occupy an area the size of Montreals Olympic Stadium or Torontos Skydome -not much more.

Instead there was an amorphous enemy who was not confined to any particular geographic area and which was not readily distinguishable from the non-enemy population.This enemy is of unknown number -but certainly they are in the thousands or high hundreds -not the 30 man platoon that must have been envisioned.

Can you see that a company sized battlegroup, while it might take over and control the Skydome could not take over and control Toronto?

Well that is the problem. Kabul and later Kandahar are both areas far too heavily populated and far too widespread for the number of troops we have on the ground.

So the best our troops can do is go from place to place seeking out those insurgents foolish enough to reveal themselves. Wiser insurgents simply leave the area and return when our troops leave -and leave they must -because they are too few in number to stay and dominate the area.

Coincidentally, the very presence of our troops is offensive to the locals and doubtless aids the insurgents in their recruiting efforts.

Further, because our troops travel in ground vehicles, the insurgents have developed a perfect weapon -the IED -to combat them. Some 90% of our casualties have been caused not by gunfire in pitched battle but by the humble roadside IED! The enemy may be illiterate, but they are not stupid!

Our political masters should have anticipated all this. Even though they hadn't read Clauswitz surely some of them have read Kipling?

One might think that I am now going to go into a diatribe suggesting that we send a division, or at least a reinforced brigade group of troops to "get the job done".

Nay Verily!

Even an entire division (and relax, we don't even HAVE one!) could do this.

Didn't we learn this when the Russians with huge and extremely capable forces were sent scurrying out of Afghanistan with their tails between their legs?

Don't our history books recount much the same thing happening to the much-vaunted thin red line of British infantry a hundred and thirty-odd years earlier?

Wasn't it Einstein who stated that idiocy might be defined as doing the same thing again and again and expecting a different result?

What I am saying here is that the initial planners of our military activity in Afghanistan were not really making a military plan but a political one.

We can see now that this was a mistake.

I for one do not care who bares the "blame" for this -although I suspect there will be some good mud-slinging in Parliament. In essence, there will be blood all over the place -but no brains!

I just want to see our troops withdrawn unless some proper military plan is put in place and proper assets provided to carry it out.

And since I believe that our army is exhausted and strained beyond belief if not repair -I suggest that withdrawl is the only option.

Because "winning" surely isn't!

Jock Williams Yogi 13