Of Canada’s three constitutional pillars—Parliamentary government, federalism, and the Charter of Rights—the public is least enamored with the first. The steady decline of Parliament says as much about the public as it does about Stephen Harper. The principle of responsible government—that the executive is accountable to Parliamentarians whose democratic mandates come from the voters in their constituencies—dates back to 1848, but there is a woeful ignorance about it in the land. Like the technology behind the telegram and the motives driving eugenics, many Canadians appear to consider the principle of Parliamentary supremacy as either obsolete or distasteful. Canadians’ historic deference to authority has faded, populist sentiments abound, and a clamour to elect Senators and even the Governor General has taken root. These fit poorly with the principle behind responsible government and contribute to the disempowerment of Parliament.

Harper brilliantly convinced much of the public and the media in December 2008 that elections are about choosing a prime minister rather than Parliamentarians. He proved equally persuasive to the constitutionally unacquainted in asserting that a party’s Parliamentary plurality democratically trumps Parliament’s majority. Can one fault him? However constitutionally shaky his plea, his political neck was on the line and he escaped execution. Indeed, it emboldened him. Compelled by the Liberals to provide the House of Commons with periodic updates on his economic plan, Harper took to presenting them at staged campaign-style rallies stacked with partisans far from Parliament Hill and at substantial taxpayers’ expense.

The next step in Parliament’s decline could come with the introduction of the budget at Tim Hortons, following the model of Ontario’s last Conservative government, who presented theirs at a Magna facility. Abuse of Parliament predates this administration; the Liberals regularly made major policy announcements in Parliament only after they had made them outside and they pioneered the arbitrary rescheduling of opposition days to avoid defeat during the dying days of Paul Martin’s government. Canada’s parliament, according to the director of the Constitution Unit at University College, London is “more dysfunctional than any of the other Westminster parliaments . . . in Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. and Scotland." Only in Canada has a government prorogued Parliament to save itself from political defeat or difficulty and only in Canada has a Governor General been a party to it.

The rising power and prowess of provincial governments over the last century has also contributed to Parliament’s infirmity; premiers have undermined MPs and Senators as the perceived spokespersons for local and regional interests. Regional ministers such as C. D. Howe and Allan MacEachen, once powerful forces in cabinet, continue nominally but compared to premiers they are political lightweights. Since 1982, the Charter has further compromised Parliament’s supremacy. Canadians are more likely to trust courts and judges than Parliament, which many scorn, or its members whose motives they suspect. Many interest groups shun Parliament and prefer to address the courts to get what they seek or fight what they oppose.

The media abet Parliament’s decline by devoting more attention to style and the partisan horse race than to policy substance. Media superficiality, in catering to the lowest common denominator, feeds gullibility. The media offer short-term images of leaders, which may pass like nanoseconds, while longer-term images they convey have a cumulative effect. Harper’s rehearsed piano playing at the NAC temporarily boosted his popularity, but his imperious behaviour in suspending Parliament has dampened it, exposing a pattern of deviousness. After making Parliamentary accountability a centrepiece in his successful 2006 election campaign, he proceeded to provide less of it. It may cost him if an image of unprincipled cunning sticks.

What can arrest and reverse the debilitation of Parliament? The answer must come from those who have enervated it: the political parties and their leaders. Jack Layton has suggested that the decision to prorogue Parliament ought not to be the prime minister’s alone but that it come only by a resolution of the Commons. Could such a motion, however, be any more effective than parliament’s fixed election date law? None of the opposition parties made Harper’s calling of the 2008 election – a contest costing over $300 million and in violation of the spirit of Parliament’s law – a major campaign issue. It is still uncertain that they will make prorogation and Parliament’s status itself an issue in the next election.

To determine Parliament’s confidence in the government, Parliament must continually hold ministers to account, for example by compelling them to provide documentation when demanded. If the opposition parties are serious about Parliament’s decline, they can assert its authority when the House reconvenes. Before voting on either the Throne Speech or the budget, which would license Harper to seek prorogation yet again when it suits him, they might insist as a matter of Parliamentary privilege on obtaining the documents Parliament has demanded. Failing that, they could hold the ministers responsible in contempt of Parliament and expel them as MPs. Settling for less will imply that the opposition parties are complicit in Parliament’s desultory descent.