What’s up with Canadian Policy in Afghanistan?
Afghanistan was the “just” war in Canada’s multilateral eyes, sanctioned by the UN and engaged by NATO. What are the results after eight years and an estimated $18 billion expenditure on Canada’s part alone? Benchmarks and performance indicators in the most recent “progress” report from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the quarter ending in June show little progress, but the report repeatedly and hopefully refers to the positive impact an infusion of more American troops should have. Since June, the additional American troops inserted into the theatre have encountered opposition even more forceful than before their arrival. Released in September, the report waxed enthusiastic about Afghanistan’s “democratic” August election and saluted the determination of Afghans to build their democracy. The conduct of that election suggests that Canada is more determined to build Afghan democracy than are the Afghans.
A contrast between Iraq and Afghanistan is that Iraq, cobbled together a few generations ago by the imperial British, is a country. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq demonstrated with its army, in its oil sector, and in contending for the leadership of the Arab League, the power of its state institutions. In contrast, Afghanistan has never been a functional state. Beyond warlords, tribalism, and intense localism, Afghans despise foreign interlopers. The Karzai government is thoroughly corrupt, engages in systemic torture, and is largely ineffectual beyond Kabul. Where tolerated, it is because of its concessions to autonomous local barons. Such truths are uncomfortable for Canadians who would prefer to hear of girls learning to read in Canadian-built schools.
The DFAIT report referred to Canada’s “steady resolve” and it assessed developments in the quarter ending in June as “productive.” Were they? Canada’s top priority is to enable Afghan forces to sustain a more secure environment. The target is five trained Afghan army brigades before the departure of Canada’s combat troops in 18 months. What has happened? In June 2008, one brigade was capable of sustaining “near-autonomous” operations; a year later, nothing has changed on this score. In only one of Kandahar’s districts do locals report feeling secure or perceive their security improving. The story is no less bleak on the development front. Canada’s target is to train 3,000 teachers for the province by 2011; it has trained 100 and the percentage of Kandaharis satisfied with the provision of educational services has deteriorated from 65 to 44 in the past year.
In his book, Rick Hillier tellingly observes that in Ottawa only the Department of National Defence and the armed forces are engaged in the war. The rest of the political class and bureaucratic machine of government in his estimation are AWOL. The reason is that most Canadians have never felt that they are at war or affected by it. They have other priorities and apparently feel unthreatened by an unstable, fractured Afghanistan. Popular support for the war effort is flagging, as it is in Britain and the United States.
Hillier had his run at his “scumbags” and the scumbags outran him. His refurbished military is exhausted and cannot sustain the combat mission; it lacks fresh soldiers. Canada has gained credibility within NATO as NATO has lost credibility as an alliance. The Afghanistan policies of the political parties are steady only in their resolve to withdraw all combat troops no later than 2011. The prime minister who berated those who would “cut and run,” is cutting and running. The NDP, which in 2007 voted with the Conservatives against a Liberal motion to withdraw the troops by this past February, cannot praise Obama enough and refrains from criticizing his large increase in American soldiers. The Liberals, being Liberals, fudge their position. It is virtually indistinguishable from that of the Conservatives.
Afghans are an impoverished people. Democracy, alien to their history and political culture, is likely absent from their list of priorities. Democratic institutions are rooted in civil society of which Afghanistan has little. The rationale for the war was that the Taliban were shielding Al-Qaeda. The assumption was that the Taliban controlled the country. No one ever has. The Soviets and the Afghan Communists tried to build a nation state but the zealously independent and proud Afghans, with U.S. assistance, undid that effort. Can Canada contribute much after 2011 with its 100 civilians in the country?
Dream on.
Nelson Wiseman teaches political science at the University of Toronto.

Comments
This is a fifth world country and we Canadians are not going to elevate it even to third world status through further sacrifice of our troops and treasure.
Accordingly, we should get out of there.
I suspect that currently the only reason why we are not doing so is that Mr Harper does not wish to reverse himself -I believe he would look upon this as a sign of weakness.
In point of fact the ability to say "I was wrong -and have decided to change my policy" is a sign of strength and maturity -and would, I think, be welcomed by the Canadian people.
The only area where Mr Wiseman errs is in stating that General Hillier "got his run at the scumbags".
General Hillier was limited to the employment of a fraction of one brigade -way too small a force to succeed in clearing anything more than the area of a small town of insurgents.
Some areas of that size were indeed cleared -but as soon as our forces left the area, the insurgents returned.
Why should that surprise us?
If we had a division in theatre we might actually have been able to "hold" some major percentage of Kandahar province.
Sadly the Canadian Army does not in fact possess a fieldable division.
But maybe that's not so bad -at least it means we couldn't SEND that many troops on this wild goose chase!
I hope Canada has learned from this exercise one of the most important lessons of warfare in general.Match the troop deployment to the job.
The corollary of course is -match your national commitment to your troop deployment.Maybe in fact we actually did that. Maybe we only cared a little.
We sent way less than a brigade because apparently we didn't care all that much. In so doing we sent our troops into danger without being prepared to fight to win. A brigade group would have been better -and a division better still -but like I said -that is more than we have -and Afghanistan is and will remain a quagmire.
I guess perhaps the new rule should be "Don't play in the quagmire."
Rick Hillier knows these rules. His political masters apparently do not.
Pity!
Jock Williams Yogi 13
That is unforgiveable. Our troops deserve better